Danger from Above: The Time is Now to Address Drone Risks

It is not “if” but “when” for a major and nefarious event happens involving Small Unmanned Aircraft (sUAS) like drones. There is a distinct lack of urgency across all levels of government about security, safety and emergency preparedness given the rise of drones and their rapidly maturing capabilities and demonstrated use cases. The question is: are we paying attention?

Look at the increasing news reports about how these platforms are disrupting security and safety almost daily. In 2023 alone, there was an uptick in these events. Look no further than the New Hampshire incident during which a private citizen decided to use a drone to drop feces and eggs on homeless encampments. Or look at how in New Jersey, a man decided to drop chemicals into swimming pools, turning the water yellow or green.

Major events like NFL playoff games and rock concerts have been disrupted and delayed by drones. Before these events, we’d seen drones harassing U.S. Customs and Border Protection helicopters in 2021, drones disrupting critical infrastructure power in Pennsylvania, leaflets dropped over NFL games, and the list goes on.

Additionally, we see the rapid evolution of sUAS technology through the lens of current wars. In Ukraine, for example, the use of first-person-view (FPV) drones has become revolutionary in military affairs, changing modern conflict in a way that has not been seen since the advent of the machine gun during World War I. These drones used with this technique and current capabilities are precision strike weapons that put fear in combatants on both sides just by the sound of their rotors. In Gaza, the use of sUAS in urban combat has proven effective for Israeli ground forces for reconnaissance in buildings and tunnels.

These wars and wars before them show that drone technology is maturing fast, and use cases abound for threat considerations. Their use is only limited by imagination and creativity, which poses a significant challenge for critical infrastructure protection professionals. And as the creativity emerges, the ideas are shared worldwide via the internet—creating a scenario where copycatting is only a click away.

Militaries around the world are paying attention. In fact, it would be hard to find a country today that isn’t diving deep into technology, and not just aerial applications. For those of us who are keeping a mindful eye on the dangers of drones, we continue to have a front-row seat to one of the greatest revolutions in military affairs that has a direct impact on society and everyday life.

However, despite this rapid technology evolution and the now countless incidents that have raised the red flag over and over, changes have been slow, delayed or even nonexistent at times. Of particular concern is the security of critical infrastructure and mass-gathering events. These important functions and aspects of daily life are tremendously under-resourced for proper risk mitigation measures, and quite frankly, owners/operators should be screaming from the highest mountaintop about this issue.

Like the cybersecurity shock and awe 10 years ago, drone technology can cause serious physical harm, disrupt life systems and affect the Internet of Things—making it an even more formidable problem. Consider the threats that are posed by common drones with payloads:

• Drone with an IED payload.
• Drone with a liquid payload.
• Drone with surveillance payload (camera/video capability).
• Drone with electronic jamming payload.
• Drone with a cyberattack payload.
• Drone with contraband payload.
• Drones used in a swarm, loitering munition or FPV direct attack mode.
• Drones used by hobbyists for pictures and videos (no nefarious intent) but that cause disruption.

These threats require substantial thought, considering the entire drone ecosystem and how woefully far behind we are in counter-sUAS law. Now, let’s consider the sUAS market space. The sUAS market consists of:

• Drone sellers/manufacturers. The commercial drone market already produces technology for a myriad of use cases and is expected to grow to $100 billion in sales by 2030. These companies produce drones that are used for deliveries, inspections, monitoring and many additional applications.
• Drone detection, monitoring and visualization. This segment of the market creates and sells systems designed to detect, track, monitor and inform on a drone’s location. and potential intentions.
• Counter-uncrewed aerial systems (CUAS) mitigation. This portion of the market creates and sells systems that can be used to impact a UAS’s flight, including kinetic, jamming, GPS disruption and signal take control/command.
• Drone as a Security Service. This market segment allows security practitioners to use drone technology as a patrolling and quick-reaction resource. It can be implemented as a permanent solution or contracted for special events.
• Training, exercises and operations. A growing section of the market is focusing on assessment and staff coordination to set conditions for a drone event. Training, exercises and operations are a direct reflection of a drone vulnerability and risk assessment (DVRA), drone emergency response planning (DERP) and Left of sUAS Launch (LoDL).
• Consumers (private and public) or drone users. The buyers of technology.

In this age of rapid technology advancement, the days of having time and space for decision-making continue to diminish based on the development speed and capabilities of the platforms. Since 2010, small drones have increased in all facets of design. From parts to payload capabilities, there is no sign of slowing in sight, and this will only be hampered by a lack of imagination. In fact, a young man in South Africa recently broke a world record for the fastest speed of a small drone, hitting 300 mph. This amazing technology development only increases the concern for security professionals as the time from launch to target significantly decreases. As we look at the rapid growth in the platform itself, we must also consider the technologies designed to detect and mitigate nefarious drones.

These pillars in the ecosystem often exist as compartmentalized product offerings as companies maneuver in the market to provide technical solutions. The first of these capabilities is detection, and within this pillar, there are four distinct ways to detect a small drone in flight. Most used are radio-frequency (RF) sensors, but radar, optical (cameras) and acoustic (microphones) sensors also play a key role.

The challenge in detection lies in the ability to bring a layered sensor package to market at a competitive price that businesses would be willing to purchase. Layered sensor packages comprise RF, radar, optical and acoustic in one integrated package. Over time, this has proven to be difficult and costly. Additionally, some defined detection rules in the United States only allow for the detection of a drone in flight that is identified by a DJI product called AeroScope. This is because DJI consumers sign a waiver upon purchase to have their drones detected.

Other products or capabilities in the market have come up against current U.S. law, but opinions on the new FAA remote identification mandate may help shape a change. This is yet to be decided.

Next is the mitigation market space. In this area of the drone ecosystem, four categories encompass the technology options: kinetic, signal jamming, GNSS disruption and take control/command tools. These tools are capable but not allowed for use under current U.S. law unless the operation falls into a specific category outlined in 2018 Defending the Homeland legislation. Additionally, there is a gap in education, training, hands-on workshops, and assessment and planning frameworks that support security program evolution. Legacy security programs simply do not consider the air domain as a physical problem—and that in itself is a problem. The best methodology to take considers the following roadmap:

• CUAS and law.
• DVRA (to include data from a detection technology).
• DERP.
• LoDL plan development and operationalization.

If done in sequence, these steps provide the needed foundations for strong sUAS security, safety and emergency preparedness in addition to the security program. Like hostile vehicle mitigation and cybersecurity, sUAS is the current technological advancement that presents a complex problem for businesses to address.

In the Absence of Adequate Legislation, Here’s What You Can Do

Critical infrastructure and utility security, safety and emergency preparedness professionals should consider the state of current legislation when developing and planning an upgrade to their security programs. The current law, known as the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, is nested under the FAA Reauthorization Act and remains under a continuing resolution until December 20, 2024, when the next decision on funding will be made.

In general, this law is recognition that drones are evolving, but it falls short of authorizing mitigation technologies and operations below the federal level of government, with some rare exceptions. However, regarding detection, tracking and identification of potential drone events, utility professionals should consider assessing, building emergency response and operationalizing LoDL plans to identify any sUAS approaching their facilities while also (1) executing geolocation of the operator and (2) simultaneously informing local law enforcement to take action in real time. This would require detailed mutual-aid agreements that support the foundational assessment, emergency plan and proactive LoDL operation. The reality is that legislation does exist that supports some form of proactive posture. The true gap in market understanding is developing the physical security program to address an air-domain event. Lack of knowledge and foundational assessment, policy, plans and procedures require rapid development.

Ways to Make Change Happen

Given that legislation is not moving at a speed that adequately addresses the threat, your organization can take some steps to influence change that will empower greater sUAS security. The first step is to notify your representative of your concern. The more voices heard, the more likely our representatives will be to entertain meetings and a deeper dive about drone evolution from a threat perspective.

Second, work with critical infrastructure governing and professional organizations to include CUAS and law, DVRA, DERP and LoDL in the standards for emergency response planning and inculcation into governing policy and procedures. This is a major gap in traditional and legacy physical security. Lastly, look at the organizations in the market that represent security, safety and emergency preparedness and add your voice to their membership by highlighting the need to protect critical infrastructure from the air domain. Our life systems are vulnerable more now than at any other time in recent history. The more you can do to proactively address the threat and make change happen, the better your utility security will be.

In Conclusion

Security, safety and emergency preparedness professionals are in a unique position to take advantage of the changing physical security landscape. The air domain is now a viable threat consideration. We already know critical infrastructure and mass-gathering events are key targets with high-risk factors for a nefarious event. And we know emerging tactics with drones continue to rise. The key consideration here is the relative speed of change. Specifically, in the last six months, we have seen potential threat vector additions added to drones, and we can expect more new ideas to continue to surface. In the end, security, safety and emergency preparedness professionals do not have the luxury of time and space pertaining to drones. The ability to avoid considering the air domain has passed; we must now “look up” when developing comprehensive, layered and integrated security programs.

About Col. Bill Edwards: Col. Bill Edwards retired from the military in 2018 and is now the executive vice president of security services for PMY Group. Bill has more than 35 years of expertise in operational/technical security, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, surveillance and counter-surveillance. He served as the director of intelligence for Theater Special Operations Command-North (USSOCOM), a position that required extensive collaboration and partnering across the U.S. whole of government security enterprise. Bill recently published a book, “Inside Abu Ghraib: Memoirs of Two U.S. Military Intelligence Officers,” and he has also published more than 100 articles on security-related topics. Bill teaches leadership, strategic communications and negotiations to Department of Defense officers and civilians through the Air War College. Reach him at bill.edwards@pmygroup.com.